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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, a district court found a patent for a medical device
valid.' While the district court litigation was pending, however, the
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") found the exact same patent
invalid. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit then affirmed
both decisions. 3 At first glance, the idea that a patent could be found
valid in one forum but invalid in another seems absurd. Yet the law
condones these results: district courts and the PTO apply different
claim construction standards.4
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 ("AIA") created
new post-grant proceedings at the PTO to challenge patent validity,
which increased the stakes of the dual claim construction regime.5 In
particular, the inter partes review ("IPR") proceeding has become
1. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
2. Id. at 1334-35.
3. Id. at 1333, 1335.
4. Claim construction is the process of interpreting terms in a patent, similar to
interpreting terms in a contract. Standards of claim construction are the legal rules used to
interpret patent terms. See Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Newman, J., additional views) ("[T]he same issue can be finally adjudicated to different
appellate outcomes, depending on the tribunal from which it came.").
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012); William Hannah, Major Change, New Chapter: How Inter
Partes Review and Post Grant Review Proceedings Created by the America Invents Act Will Shape
Litigation Strategies, 17 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 27, 39-44 (2012) (describing advantages of post
grant proceedings to litigants, such as lower costs, quicker time frames, and lower burdens of
proof).
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extremely popular.6 Over 5,200 inter partes review petitions have been
filed at the PTO since the proceeding's inception in September 2012.7
The popularity is due, in part, to the fact that the proceedings have
turned out to be surprisingly lethal to granted patents: eighty-four
percent of final written decisions have invalidated some or all
challenged claims, making the proceeding very attractive to patent
challengers.8 This high invalidation rate sparked debate about the
differing claim construction standards. The PTO applies the broadest
reasonable interpretation ("BRI") standard, which liberally construes
terms. District courts, in contrast, apply the Phillips standard, which
more narrowly looks to the ordinary and customary meaning of a term
based on the written patent document. The difference in construction
has the potential to affect a patent's validity because when a term is
construed broadly, the patent is more likely to cover preexisting ideas
or inventions and to therefore be considered unworthy of patent
protection. Thus, some commentators believe the BRI standard
employed by the PTO is more likely to invalidate a patent than the
Phillips standard applied in district courts.9 Yet others suggest there is
little, if any, difference between the two standards.1 0 The rising debate
caught the attention of the Supreme Court, which affirmed the use of
the BRI standard during IPR proceedings in Cuozzo Speed
Technologies, LLC 11 in June 2016. With IPRs now commonplace in the
6. IPR proceedings allow third parties to challenge a patent's validity at the PTO directly,
rather than in a district court. Before the AIA, third parties could challenge patent validity during
district court proceedings, but had very limited opportunities to do so at the PTO. For more
information, see Section I.A.
7. Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics 10/31/2015, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 2
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia-statistics-october2Ol6.pdf (last visited
Feb. 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/57V2-4CQW] (statistics current as of Oct. 31, 2016).
8. Neil C. Jones, The Five Most Publicized Patent Issues Today, BUS. L. TODAY 4 (May 2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublications/blt/2014/05/five-patent-issues-201405
.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HQ8-NL9D] ("The reported high success rates will only add
more fuel to the fire, resulting in even more challenges being filed."); Patent Trial and Appeal
Board Statistics 10/31/2015, supra note 7; see also Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse,
Comments on Latest Patent Reform Bill, BNA BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.bna.com/
rader-regrets-cls-nl7179879684 [https://perma.cc/D28T-X8WJ] (quoting Judge Rader describing
the administrative law judges in the post grant proceedings as "death squads, killing property
rights").
9. See Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 916 (2015) (explaining
that the broadest reasonable construction standard "make[s] it much easier for the patent
challenger to prevail" in proceedings at the PTO than in district court litigation); Paul R. Michel,
Why Rush Patent Reform?, 7 LANDSLIDE 49, 50 (2015) (noting that the post grant review
proceedings at the PTO are "unfavorable" to patent owners because the PTO "applies the 'broadest
reasonable construction,' rather than the 'correct construction' applied by courts").
10. See Thomas King & Jeffrey A. Wolfson, PTAB Rearranging the Face of Patent Litigation,
6 LANDSLIDE 18, 21 (2013) ("[I]t is difficult to say how the two standards are different, if at all.").
11. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
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patent litigation landscape, the difference between the claim
construction standards is of vital importance. 12
This Note contributes to the debate by providing empirical
evidence of the legal authority cited in IPR proceedings. Based on the
empirical findings, this Note argues that the different claim
construction standards have largely converged in practice, despite their
differing rationales. Part I of this Note discusses the rise of IPR
proceedings and the development of the dual claim construction regime.
Part II presents empirical findings about how the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board ("PTAB") applies the BRI standard in IPR proceedings to
show that both standards employ the same legal tools. Part III analyzes
why the two standards have converged in practice, suggesting the
convergence is due to similar guidance and shared canons of
construction. Part IV proposes that, because the BRI standard in
practice operates similarly to the Phillips standard, Congress should
abolish the BRI standard and adopt the Phillips standard. Though
abolishing the BRI standard would likely make little practical
difference in terms of how often patent claims are invalidated because
the standards are already so similar, recognizing a unified claim
construction system would better support the goals of the patent
system, such as efficiency, uniformity, and confidence in patent rights.
I. THE DUAL CLAIM CONSTRUCTION REGIME
Patent claims are interpreted in two primary forums: the PTO
and the federal court system. 13 When an applicant submits a patent
application, the PTO construes the claims to determine whether the
claimed invention is patentable (i.e., novel and non-obvious). When a
patentee sues a competitor for infringement or a competitor claims that
a patent is invalid, courts construe the claim terms to determine the
scope of the patented invention. Thus, the dual claim construction
regime developed in response to differences between these two distinct
forums. This Part explores how these two distinct forums gave rise to
the dual claim construction system that sparked the Cuozzo
controversy. Section A describes how the recent rise of IPR proceedings
has blurred the distinction between the two forums and heated the
debate about the dual claim construction system. Section B provides an
overview of how claim construction operates in both forums. Section C
12. See Aashish Kapadia, Inter Partes Review: A New Paradigm in Patent Litigation, 23 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 113, 115 (2015) ("[T]he IPR proceeding has rapidly grown into a necessary
option for patent owners and challengers alike.").
13. This dual system dates back to before the America Invents Act.
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explains the distinct policy rationales behind the two standards, which
are based on differences between the PTO and the courts.
A. The Rise of IPRs and Increasing Scrutiny of BRI
In the early 2000s, concerns arose about the issuing of low-
quality patents, increasing frequency and cost of patent litigation, and
resulting disincentives to innovation.1 4 To improve patent quality and
reduce litigation costs, the AIA created new proceedings at the PTO to
challenge patent validity, including IPRs.15 IPRs replaced a former
system called inter partes reexamination, with the goal of converting
these proceedings to be more like an adjudication than an
examination. 16 The AIA also created the PTAB, a new board of
administrative law judges, to hear these new litigation-like
proceedings.17
An IPR proceeding allows any person other than the patent
owner to file a petition with the PTO to challenge the validity of a
patent. 18 The petition must identify the grounds for the challenge, and
the patent owner then files a preliminary response showing why the
PTO should not institute an IPR.1 9 The AIA places time constraints on
the proceeding-the PTAB must decide whether to grant the petition
and institute a proceeding within three months, and, if so, must issue a
final written decision within twelve months. 20 Either the patent owner
or the patent challenger can appeal final written decisions to the
Federal Circuit. 21 IPR proceedings are similar to litigation in many
ways; for example, IPR proceedings provide limited discovery, permit
14. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] solution was sought to a major problem confronting United States industrial
advance: the burgeoning patent litigation and the accompanying cost, delay, and overall
disincentive to investment in innovation."); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98(I), pt. 1, at 39 (2011), as reprinted
in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 69 (discussing a "growing sense that questionable patents are too easily
obtained and are too difficult to challenge"); Dolin, supra note 9, at 881-82.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98(I), pt. 1, at 40 ("The legislation is designed
to establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and
limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs."). The AILA also created post grant review
(PGR) proceedings and covered business method (CBM) proceedings. Since IPRs have been the
most popular of the three proceedings and are the subject of the Cuozzo litigation, this Note focuses
on IPR proceedings.
16. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98(I), pt. 1, at 46-47.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98(I), pt. 1, at 48.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). The challenge may be based only on grounds that could arise under
§ 102 (novelty) or § 103 (lack of nonobviousness), and "only on the basis of prior art consisting of
patents or printed publications." 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
19. 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a), 313 (2012).
20. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(b), 316(a)(11) (2012).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2012).
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requests for an oral hearing, and involve a trial before administrative
law judges. Despite these similarities, IPR proceedings differ from
litigation in that they allow a motion to amend and apply a lower
evidentiary standard.22 Overall, IPR proceedings are similar to district
court litigation because they provide third parties an opportunity to
challenge the validity of an issued patent, but IPRs operate on a shorter
timeframe and only permit challenges to validity, not other potential
claims parties may bring in district court.
The AIA is silent on which claim construction standard to apply
during IPRs. 23 The statute does, however, grant the PTO authority to
promulgate procedural rules to govern IPRs. 2 4 Under this authority, the
PTO promulgated a rule in August 2012 that applies the BRI standard
during IPR proceedings. It justified this rule based on both the
longstanding practice of applying the BRI standard in PTO proceedings
to determine patentability and the congressional silence as an implicit
approval of the BRI standard.25
Though the Supreme Court recently affirmed the validity of this
rule, the Federal Circuit was divided about whether the AIA grants
authority to the PTO to apply the BRI standard for claim construction
during IPR proceedings. 26 In the Cuozzo panel opinion, the majority
found that the use of BRI for over one hundred years in PTO
proceedings meant that Congress implicitly approved using BRI in
IPRs. 2 7 Additionally, the majority found in the alternative that the PTO
regulation governing claim construction was a procedural rule for which
the PTO has rulemaking power and thus passed muster under Chevron
deference. 28 Conversely, the dissent found that congressional silence
22. In district courts, patent challengers must provide clear and convincing evidence to
invalidate a patent claim. Yet in PTAB proceedings, patent challengers only need to prove
invalidity by preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a) (2016);
Jonathan Tamimi, Breaking Bad Patents: The Formula for Quick, Inexpensive Resolution of Patent
Validity, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 587, 617-18 (2014).
23. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("[T]he statute
on its face does not resolve the issue of whether the broadest reasonable interpretation standard
is appropriate in IPRs; it is silent on that issue.").
24. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4).
25. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-
Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77
Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,697 (Aug. 14, 2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)).
26. See Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1285 (Newman, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority
and arguing that "[t]he [AIA] plainly contemplated that the new PTO tribunal would determine
validity of issued patents on the legally and factually correct claim construction, not on a
hypothetical 'broadest' expedient ...
27. Id. at 1275-78.
28. Id. at 1278-79. The PTO only has rulemaking authority to promulgate procedural rules,
not substantive rules. See 35 U.S.C. § 316 (describing the regulations the PTO can prescribe).
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did not implicitly approve using BRI because the IPR is a completely
new type of proceeding. 29 Since IPRs are adjudicatory proceedings
created to function as a "surrogate for district court litigation," the
dissent reasoned that Congress intended the PTO to apply the same
claim construction standard as district courts. 30 Additionally, the
dissent would not have deferred to the regulation under Chevron
because it went against the congressional purpose of "substituting
administrative adjudication for district court adjudication." 31 By a vote
of 6-5, the Federal Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc, with
opinions that reiterated the disagreement over congressional intent and
deference to the PTO's regulation. 32
In January 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
Cuozzo. In the petition for certiorari, appellants argued that use of the
BRI standard in IPRs undermines the patent system's goals of
uniformity in claim construction and finality in district court
litigation." Moreover, appellants argued the BRI standard creates
uncertainty, which both devalues patent rights and invites forum
shopping between the PTO and district courts. 34 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court deferred to the PTO rule applying the BRI standard
under Chevron.35
Outside of the courtroom, Congress also has debated the issue.
Proposed legislation seeks to amend the AIA to require the PTAB to
apply the Phillips standard to construe claims during IPR
proceedings. 36 While this controversy continues, the PTAB currently
applies the BRI claim construction standard.
B. The Mechanics of Claim Construction
The debate regarding the appropriate claim construction
standard for IPRs attracted so much attention because of the vital role
29. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1284-89.
30. Id. at 1290.
31. Id. at 1290-91. For a detailed discussion of the debate over whether the Federal Circuit
should defer to PTO interpretations in light of the AIA, see Samiyyah R. Ali, Note, The Great
Balancing Act: The Effect of the America Invents Act on the Division of Power Between the Patent
and Trademark Office and the Federal Circuit, 69 VAND. L. REV. 217, 221-48 (2016).
32. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1297, 1298-1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (order
denying petition for rehearing en banc).
33. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131
(2016) (No. 15-446), 2015 WL 5895939, at *14-19.
34. Id.
35. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2142-45.
36. See PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 11(a)(4)(A)(vii) (as reported by S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, June 4, 2015, with Manager's Amendment in the nature of a substitute); STRONG
Patents Act of 2015, S. 632, 114th Cong. § 102(a) (as introduced on March 3, 2015).
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claim construction plays in the patent system. Claim construction is a
"bedrock principle" of patent law. 3 7 Claims define the scope of a
patentee's right to exclude in both the examination and litigation
contexts, and claim construction is how one determines the scope of a
claim. 38 Claim construction refers to the process of interpreting the
terms in a patent, similar to interpreting the terms of a statute. 39 In a
patent, the claims define the invention that receives patent
protection.40 Thus, an inventor can exclude others from making, using,
or selling only his claimed invention.4 1 In a patent infringement
lawsuit, a defendant is considered to infringe if he makes, uses, or sells
every element of the patent owner's claimed invention. Therefore, claim
construction is the necessary first step to interpret what exactly the
inventor claimed before determining whether the defendant potentially
infringed. 42 Beyond the infringement analysis, claim construction is
also essential to determine the validity of a patent. A patent is valid
only if the claimed invention is new, non-obvious, and clearly described.
Here, claim construction again serves as the first step to define the
claimed invention. If all elements of the claimed invention can be found
in prior art 4 3 or if the claimed invention would have been obvious to
make based on the prior art, the patent is invalid and, therefore,
unenforceable. Thus, claim construction is of central importance to both
patent owners and competitors, as it is a threshold question in virtually
every patent dispute. 44
To construe claims, courts and the PTO apply claim construction
standards. These standards of interpretation guide the process of
37. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting
Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
38. Id.; see also Merill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (noting claims are "of primary
importance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is patented").
39. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical,
and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) (defining
claim construction).
40. Merill, 94 U.S. at 570 (noting claims are "of primary importance, in the effort to ascertain
precisely what it is that is patented").
41. See id. at 570-74 (analyzing an inventor's claims to determine what is protected).
42. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 39, at 3-4 ("When patentees seek to enforce their
rights in court, the interpretation of patent claim boundaries guides both infringement and validity
analysis.").
43. Prior art refers to all evidence that an invention is already known. It may include other
patents, printed publications, industry knowledge, and commercially available products.
44. In the IPR context, the PTAB reviews the validity of patents but does not make
judgments about infringement. Thus, this Note focuses on claim construction for validity purposes.
In the validity context, a broader claim interpretation has potential to encompass a broader array
of prior art, and thus is more likely to lead to a finding of invalidity. This is why many patent
owners are concerned about applying the BRI standard in IPRs-the BRI is considered broader
than the Phillips standard.
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interpreting claim terms.4 5 Two primary evidentiary sources are used
to construe claims: intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. 46 Intrinsic evidence
refers to evidence from the patent document itself. This includes the
language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history.
The specification is a detailed, written description of the claimed
invention.47 The prosecution history is a written record of the back and
forth between the patent examiner and the patent owner during the
application process. For example, the prosecution history may contain
statements by the patent owner explaining the meaning of a claim term
in response to a rejection by the examiner. These three sources of
intrinsic evidence are analogous to statutory interpretation tools: the
claims are similar to the language of a statute; the specification is
similar to the committee reports; and the prosecution history resembles
legislative history.48 In contrast, extrinsic evidence refers to sources
outside the patent document, such as dictionaries, treatises, expert
testimony, and inventor testimony. In some cases, claim construction is
straightforward and merely involves applying a commonly understood
definition. However, most cases that spark litigation involve disputed
terms that require examining their particular meaning in a specialized
field.49
C. Differing Policies for Differing Forums
The two different contextual backdrops-determining whether a
patent should be granted at the PTO and determining whether a patent
should be enforced in the courts-led to the doctrinal development of
the differing BRI and Phillips standards. The BRI standard developed
in the patent prosecution context to allow the patent examiner and the
applicant to explore claim scope and to clarify meaning during the
interactive process of examining the patent application. 50 The Phillips
standard, however, developed in the litigation context based on the
need to find the "correct" claim construction and to balance that need
with efficient judicial administration. 51 Thus, while both standards
45. See Andrew J. Fischer & David A. Jones, The Bow Tie of Patent Claim Construction, 4
LANDSLIDE 21, 22 (2012) (describing standards of interpretation). But see Anderson & Menell,
supra note 39, at 4 (noting claim construction standards "are notoriously amorphous and
uncertain").
46. Anderson & Menell, supra note 39, at 43.
47. This written description may also include figures and drawings.
48. Anderson & Menell, supra note 39, at 43 n.251.
49. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
50. Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
51. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19 (discussing the merits of allowing extrinsic evidence in
claim interpretation).
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seek to determine whether a claimed invention is novel compared to all
existing prior art, the BRI standard aims to develop a written record
that clearly defines claim scope, while district courts aim to interpret
that written record to discern what the inventor actually intended to
claim.
1. District Courts: Searching for the Correct Construction
In a 2005 en banc decision, the Federal Circuit articulated the
current controlling standard, known as the Phillips standard, for claim
construction in litigation proceedings.52 This standard aims to discern
the "correct" construction of patent claim terms based on the inventor's
intent. 53 The Phillips standard directs that words of a claim are given
their "ordinary and customary meaning" as the meaning of "the term
would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the
time of the invention." 54 The emphasis on the person of ordinary skill
in the art comes from the "well-settled understanding" that patents are
typically "addressed to and intended to be read by" people skilled in the
field of invention.55 Thus, the standard's goal is to interpret the claims
as the inventor intended and as the interested public (those of ordinary
skill in the art) would interpret them. Moreover, the standard supports
construing claims to show the invention that the inventor actually
intended to claim and cautions against overly broad interpretations.56
The Federal Circuit has, however, noted that the desire to interpret
claims according to the inventor's intent warranted some overlap with
the PTO construction, emphasizing that part of the reason courts
52. Id. at 1311-24. Though principles of claim construction had been outlined in previous
decisions, the Federal Circuit noted that some aspects of claim construction required clarification,
particularly the role of dictionaries in interpreting claims. Id. at 1312. For simplicity, this Note
refers to the district court jurisprudence on claim construction all together as the Phillips
standard. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-86 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(providing construction principles that Phillips draws on); Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (exploring how specification relates to claims),
aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
53. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (noting that the inventor's intention, as expressed in the
specification, is regarded as dispositive).
54. Id. at 1313. The time of invention is the effective filing date of the patent. Id.
55. Id. The person of ordinary skill is not a judge, jury, or technical expert. See In re Nelson,
280 F.2d 172, 181 (C.C.P.A. 1960) ("The descriptions in patents are not addressed to the public
generally, to lawyers or to judges, but, as section 112 says, to those skilled in the art to which the
invention pertains or with which it is most nearly connected.").
56. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321-22 (explaining that the "risk of systemic overbreadth is greatly
reduced" if the court focuses claim construction on intrinsic evidence).
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should rely heavily on the specification is because the PTO also does so
when determining whether to grant the patent.57
The policy justifications underlying the Phillips standard
include the public notice function of patents, the desire for uniformity
in patent jurisprudence, and the need for efficient judicial
administration.5 8 The public notice function of patents, a central policy
goal in patent law, states that a patent should put the interested public
on notice about what is covered by the patent. 59 By focusing the inquiry
on the intrinsic evidence, the Phillips standard aims to incentivize the
patent owner to clearly describe the invention in the patent document,
which in turn allows the public to easily understand the boundaries of
the patent owner's claimed invention upon reading the patent
document. This therefore enables the public take steps to avoid
infringement.60 Moreover, judges, rather than juries, conduct claim
construction in order to support uniformity. 61 The hope is that judges
applying a uniform standard of claim construction will further the
public notice function of patents, as it puts both inventors and the
interested public on notice of how claims will typically be interpreted. 62
Additionally, the Phillips standard responds to the need for efficient
judicial administration by focusing the inquiry on intrinsic evidence
and limiting the exploration of extrinsic sources.63
2. The Patent Office: Exploring the Boundaries of the Claims
The PTO applies the BRI standard during claim construction,
which gives claims their broadest reasonable construction "in light of
the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in
the art." 6 4 This standard aims to interpret claims broadly, while staying
grounded in the written description and the perspective of one of
ordinary skill in the art. Procedural differences between court litigation
57. Id. at 1316-17 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d
1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
58. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996); Phillips, 415 F.3d
at 1318-19.
59. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 ("[I]t is 'unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law,
to construe [terms] in a manner different from the plain import of the terms.'" (quoting White v.
Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886))).
60. Id. at 1321 (citing Merill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876)).
61. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
62. See id.
63. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319 ("[Tlhere is a virtually unbounded universe of potential
extrinsic evidence of some marginal relevance ... leaving the court with the considerable task of
filtering the useful extrinsic evidence from the fluff.").
64. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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and the patent examination process partially justify the use of a
different standard in PTO proceedings. Before the PTO, the applicant
has the opportunity to amend claims during the prosecution process-
an opportunity not available in litigation. 65 Moreover, patent
applications before the PTO do not receive the same presumption of
validity that they receive in court. 66 Additionally, unlike judges in
litigation proceedings who base claim construction analysis on a fully
developed written record, a patent examiner does not yet have a fully
developed written record for pending patent applications. 6 7 Thus, the
BRI standard seeks to "establish a clear record of what [the] applicant
intends to claim." 68
The policy justifications underlying the BRI standard include
the public notice function of patents and the desire to limit the risk of
issuing an invalid patent. As noted earlier, the public notice function of
patents aims to put the interested public on notice about what a patent
covers. 69 To support the public notice function, the BRI standard
emphasizes the importance of the specification as well as interpreting
claims from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. 70
Similar to Phillips, this incentivizes patent applicants to clearly
describe their inventions in the patent document itself, which then
allows the interested public to clearly discern the scope of the patented
invention from reading the patent document.7 1 Moreover, the BRI
standard interprets claims broadly during the interactive process with
the examiner to promote development of a written record that will
"provide[ ] the requisite written notice to the public as to what the
applicant claims as the invention." 72 In particular, the prosecution
process aims to produce claims that are "precise, clear, correct, and
unambiguous." 73 Thus, the BRI standard promotes the public notice
function of patents by emphasizing the importance of the specification
65. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
66. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
67. MIPEP § 2111 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015).
68. Id.; Joel Miller, Claim Construction at the PTO-the "Broadest Reasonable
Interpretation,"88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 279, 280 (2006).
69. See supra Section I.C.1.
70. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1) (2016); MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.01 ("When the specification
sets a clear path to claim language, the scope of claims is more easily determined and the public
notice function of the claims is best served."); see also In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255,
1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
71. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1312, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Morris, 127 F.3d at
1054.
72. Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054 ("[P]ublic notice is an important objective of patent
prosecution.").
73. Miller, supra note 68, at 289.
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and aiming to produce a clear written record. 74 In addition to the public
notice function, the BRI standard "reduce[s] the possibility that the
claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified."75
By giving claims broad interpretations, the PTO responds to fears that
it may allow a claim for an invention not truly deserving of patent
protection (i.e., obvious or not novel), thus limiting the risk that the
PTO will issue a patent that is in fact invalid.76 When the PTO
interprets a claim broadly, it encompasses more prior art and is
therefore more likely to be rejected (i.e., the PTO will not grant a patent
on the application because the invention is not novel or obvious).
Therefore, interpreting claims more broadly decreases the chances that
the PTO will issue a patent that will later be found invalid.
3. But Does the Distinction Make a Difference?
The Federal Circuit has stated that the divergence between the
Phillips standard and the BRI standard is "a distinction with a
difference."77 Recently, the Federal Circuit reiterated that "[t]he
broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term may be the same as
or broader than the construction of a term under the Phillips standard.
But it cannot be narrower."78 A broader construction under the BRI
standard threatens to make it more likely a patent will be invalidated
because a broader construction encompasses more prior art. The
expanded universe of prior art makes it more likely that a patent claim
will be anticipated (i.e., considered not novel) and therefore
invalidated. 79 Some commentators have suggested that the broad
nature of the BRI standard contributes to the high invalidation rate of
claims during IPRs.80 Others, however, have suggested that the
difference between applying BRI and Phillips in IPR proceedings is
minimal because the difference between the standards is vague and
74. See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054; Miller, supra note 68, at 289.
75. MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.
76. See Miller, supra note 68, at 288 ("Perhaps the most frequently mentioned basis for the
rule is a fear that without such a standard the PTO might allow a claim anticipated by or obvious
in view of the existing art."); see also supra Section L.A (describing concerns about low-quality
patents).
77. Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054 (describing the difference between validity determinations in a
patent infringement suit and a PTO proceeding).
78. Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App'x 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(nonprecedential).
79. See Dolin, supra note 9, at 916.
80. Id.; Michel, supra note 9, at 50.
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often of little practical effect.81 Both standards have similar directions
for how to interpret claims, as both instruct claims should be read in
the context of the entire patent document, with a particular focus on
the written description. Moreover, both standards emphasize that
claims should be interpreted from the perspective of a person of
ordinary skill in the art. 82
This Note adds to the scholarly debate by conducting an
empirical study of the legal authority cited during claim construction
analysis in IPR proceedings. Citations to legal authority provide insight
into the actual legal tools of interpretation the PTAB applies during
claim construction, which sheds light on whether the BRI standard
operates differently than the Phillips standard. The next Part provides
the findings, suggesting that the legal standards applied in IPR claim
constructions closely resemble the legal standards applied in Phillips
claim constructions.
II. THE BRI STANDARD IN PRACTICE
This Part presents findings of an empirical study that show the
legal authority and claim construction principles cited under the BRI
standard overlap significantly with the Phillips standard, ultimately
arguing that the standards have in fact converged in practice. To
analyze how the PTAB applies the BRI standard, I developed a
database of 411 IPR final written decisions, beginning in February 2015
when the Cuozzo case affirmed the PTAB's authority to apply the BRI
standard. 83 The data demonstrates that in practice, the BRI operates in
a circular manner, largely citing legal authority that originates from
the Phillips regime. Section A describes the methodology used to create
the database and its limitations. Section B presents the results to show
how the two claim construction standards have converged in practice.
81. Maya Eckstein et al., Putting "Reasonable"Back in "Broadest Reasonable Interpretation,"
HUNTON & WILLIAMS 1 (June 2015), https://www.hunton.com/files/News/4dfb7279-5892-4bdb-
b06e-9dbf6fl7d8c6fPresentation/NewsAttachment/07cad96d-73ef-49e6-aOab-2e47ae9ebfb4/
Puttingreasonable-in broadest-reasonable-interpretationJune20l5.pdf [https://perma.cc/A634
-VDJN] ("The distinction between the 'broadest reasonable interpretation' standard used by the
Patent Office and the Phillips claim construction adopted by the courts is vague."); King & Wolfson,
supra note 10, at 21; Jacob Oyloe et al., Claim Construction in PTAB us. District Court, LAw 360
(Oct. 6, 2014, 10:50 AM) http://www.1aw360.com/articles/581715/claim-constructions-in-ptab-vs-
district-court [https://perma.cc/JA8K-6Z5C] (suggesting that even when the district court and the
PTAB adopt different claim constructions, the practical effect remains largely the same).
82. See infra Section III.A for a more detailed description of the specific guidance on
implementation of the standards.
83. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The database
consists of all final written decisions for IPRs from February 5, 2015 through February 4, 2016.
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A. An Empirical Look at Claim Construction in IPRs
The database created for this study consists of final written
decisions issued by the PTAB in IPR proceedings over a one-year period
following the Cuozzo decision in February 2015. In order to identify
relevant decisions, I performed a search on Westlaw to capture all final
written decisions issued under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). 84 Then, I read the
portion of each final written decision that dealt with claim construction
and coded the case law cited in each claim construction section.85 The
purpose of coding the case law is to observe the origin of the legal
authority that the PTAB applied during claim construction analysis. At
times, the PTAB, while applying the BRI standard, cited cases that
were actually applying the Phillips standard. Therefore, this study
aims to track the overlap between the two standards in practice by
observing how frequently the PTAB cited legal authority deriving from
Phillips when it applied the BRI standard to construe claims in IPRs.
To code the case law, I divided citations into three major
categories: direct district court-originated citations, indirect district
court-originated citations, and pure PTO-originated citations. Most of
the case law cited in IPR decisions comes from the Federal Circuit,
which hears appeals from both the PTO and district courts. Under the
dual claim construction regime, an appeal from a PTO proceeding is
reviewed applying the BRI standard (as that is the standard the PTO
applies in all proceedings), while an appeal from a district court
proceeding is reviewed applying the Phillips standard (as that is the
standard district courts apply). 86 Therefore, I assumed that appeals
from district court decisions were applying the Phillips claim
construction standard and appeals from PTO decisions were applying
the BRI standard.87 Thus, if a case cited in an IPR was either a district
84. This statute states, "If an inter partes review is instituted and not dismissed under this
chapter, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall issue a final written decision with respect to the
patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added under
section 316(d)." Thus, all final written decisions cite this statute. I clicked on "Citing References"
of this statute, then performed a search for "final written decision" and filtered by date to identify
the decisions that have issued since Cuozzo.
85. Most decisions have a specific section called "Claim Construction," though some just
discussed it as part of the overall decision.
86. Compare Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(applying the BRI standard when reviewing an appeal of a PTAB decision), with Thorner v. Sony
Comput. Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (applying the Phillips standard
when reviewing an appeal of a district court decision).
87. Though some district court decisions came before Phillips, the Phillips standard
endorsed past claim construction principles and just provided clarification. Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Thus, all of these decisions represent the district
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court case or a Federal Circuit case reviewing a district court case, I
labeled it as a "direct" district court citation. If a case cited in an IPR
was either a PTO decision or a Federal Circuit case reviewing a PTO
decision, I checked the specific pincite for further information. If the
pincite referred to a line that was directly quoting or citing another PTO
opinion or applying its own reasoning, I labeled the decision as a "pure
PTO" citation. If the pincite referred to a line that was directly quoting
or citing a district court-originated opinion, I labeled the decision as an
"indirect" district court citation. The citations in this category are in
essence circular citations. They cite a PTO decision, but the actual law
cited comes directly from the district court. Since the district court was
presumably applying the Phillips standard, the legal principles still
stem from the district court claim construction jurisprudence.
Most of the final written decisions cited Cuozzo for the
proposition that the AIA provided statutory authority for the PTO to
apply the BRI standard. Because this conclusory statement did not
provide direction on how to implement the BRI standard, I did not
include those citations. This study aims to track the citations to
substantive guidance about how to implement the BRI standard.
Moreover, there are two situations where the PTAB did not apply the
BRI standard: (1) if a patent expired, the PTAB applied the Phillips
standard;88 and (2) if the PTAB determined no claim construction was
required. 9 Therefore, I only coded final written decisions that applied
the BRI standard. However, I still tracked the number of cases applying
Phillips or finding no construction necessary to examine the practical
effect of the different standards because when decisions apply the
Phillips standard directly or do not need to construe claims at all, the
claim construction is not legally different from how it would be in a
district court, lowering the distinction between claim construction in
the two different forums.
A number of limitations should be acknowledged about this
approach. First, this database only reviewed final written decisions,
even though claims are also construed during decisions to institute
court claim construction standard, but I commonly refer to them all as the Phillips standard for
simplicity.
88. The PTAB applies the Phillips standard to expired patents because patent owners do not
have an opportunity to amend claims. See In re CSB-Sys. Int'l, Inc., 832 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2016); In re Rambus Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[T]he Board's review of the claims of
an expired patent is similar to that of a district court's review."); Universal Remote Control, Inc.
v. Universal Elec., Inc., No. IPR2014-01102, 2015 WL 9098805, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2015).
89. When an opinion determined no express claim construction was required, I did not
include legal citations from those final written decisions in the tracking citations that applied the
BRI standard because the PTAB did not actually construe any terms.
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IPRs. 90 Thus, this study does not capture the legal reasoning behind
claim construction in initial determinations. However, this study does
capture the legal authority cited for the claim terms that were disputed
throughout the proceedings by focusing on the final written decisions.
Second, I sorted the citations into categories based only on one level of
background checks. When a PTO decision cited a district court opinion,
I did not continue searching to see if the district court opinion was citing
another opinion. Though perhaps this method could have overlooked
times when reasoning that in fact originated at the PTO was
subsequently adopted by a district court, the purpose of this study is to
analyze the overlap between the BRI and Phillips standards. Thus, once
the citation appears in a district court opinion, it is part of the Phillips
jurisprudence and relevant to show convergence between the
standards, regardless of where the initial citation originated.
Additionally, there is potential for human error, as I sorted the data by
hand. 91 Finally, there is an inherent limitation in measuring these
standards by the legal authority quoted. Claim construction is by
nature a fact-specific inquiry, and legal citations cannot fully capture
the idiosyncratic judgments made by individual PTAB judges. Yet this
study addresses the general claim construction principles that the
PTAB applies when it analyzes the ambiguous terms using these legal
rules as a proxy for how the two standards operate in practice.92
B. Circular Citations
On the whole, the legal authority cited during claim construction
analysis in IPR decisions looks very similar to that applied in district
court litigation because (1) the majority of legal authority applied
during IPRs originated from district courts, and (2) the PTAB only
applied the BRI standard in 83% of total proceedings. This Part
analyzes the overlap in legal authority cited when proceedings applied
the BRI standard and then discusses the limited application of the BRI
standard.
To analyze the general trends in decisions that applied the BRI
standard, I sorted the data in two ways: by total number of citations
and by each final written decision. The final written decisions contained
1,389 total case citations. Of the total citations in decisions applying the
90. James Stein et al., Spotlight on Claim Construction Before the PTAB, 11 BUFF. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 73, 81-91 (2015).
91. To guard against human error, I double-checked each citation, though there is still
potential for human error.
92. See infra Section III.C for a more in-depth discussion on the fact-specific nature of the
claim construction inquiry.
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BRI standard, 72% traced back to district court claim construction
jurisprudence-49% were "direct" citations to district court cases, and
23% were "indirect" citations to district court cases. Only 28% of total
citations were "pure PTO" citations. These data suggest that the vast
majority of PTAB judges look to Phillips, and not the PTO's own
guidance, when implementing the BRI standard through statements of
legal rules. Moreover, the "indirect" citations to district court cases
demonstrate a circular phenomenon-the decisions appear to be citing
PTO authority, but in reality, the substantive doctrine comes from the
district court sphere.93
However, some final written decisions contained numerous legal
citations, while others contained only one or two. Therefore, I also
sorted the data by final written decision to view the authority per
decision-and a similar trend emerged. To view the data per decision, I
sorted the final written decisions that applied the BRI standard into
four categories: (1) decisions that cited only "direct" or "indirect" district
court authority; (2) decisions that cited at least one "direct" or "indirect"
district court authority, but also cited at least one "pure PTO" authority;
(3) cases that cited only "pure PTO" authority; and (4) cases that
provided only conclusory guidance. 94 Overall, 36% of final written
decisions cited only district court authority; 56% of final written
decisions cited a mix of district court authority and pure PTO authority;
2% cited only pure PTO authority; and 6% contained only conclusory
citations. Thus, over 90% of the decisions applied legal principles that
derived exclusively or partially from the district court realm, yet only
six decisions applied legal principles that derived purely from the PTO.
Overall, data suggest that in IPR proceedings, the BRI standard
functions as a circular standard that appears to be distinct from
Phillips, yet returns to district court-originated jurisprudence for most
of its substantive guidance. The fact that in practice the two standards
look to substantially similar legal authority questions the value of
retaining two nominally different claim construction standards.
The similarity between claim construction in IPRs and in district
courts is further enhanced by the fact that a significant portion of IPR
proceedings did not even apply the BRI standard. Out of the total
decisions, only 83% applied the BRI standard. In 7% of decisions, the
PTAB applied the Phillips standard because the patents at issue were
expired. Moreover, 10% of decisions applied no claim construction
93. See Section II.B.
94. I considered a decision to contain only conclusory guidance when it did not cite legal
authority for implementing the standard or when it cited only Cuozzo or the PTO rule for the
proposition that the BRI standard applies, without any additional legal citations.
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standard because the PTAB determined no express claim construction
was required. Thus, almost one-fifth of IPR decisions construed claims
in a manner that legally did not differ from district court claim
construction, as the PTAB either directly applied Phillips or did not
need to construe claims at all. The fact that a significant portion of IPR
decisions did not apply the BRI standard at all further illuminates the
convergence between claim construction at the PTO and at district
courts.
III. EXPLAINING THE CONVERGENCE
Despite the divergence in policy rationales, the two claim
construction standards appear to have converged in practice. This Part
analyzes the reasons for the convergence. First, Section A describes how
the PTO and the courts have provided very similar legal guidance,
employing shared canons of claim construction and operating in a
circular manner similar to the legal citations in IPRs. Second, Section
B looks at how the Federal Circuit has recently tightened the
"reasonableness" requirement in IPRs, narrowing the BRI standard
and bringing it more in line with Phillips. Yet, amidst the convergence
in legal guidance, the PTAB and courts have settled on differing
constructions for the same claim terms in a few cases. Section C takes
a fact-specific look at PTAB and federal court cases construing the same
patents to suggest that different conclusions about the same claim
terms may be due to the inherent ambiguities in interpretation or
litigant behavior rather than a difference between the legal standards.
A. Guidance from the PTO and Courts
Beyond the theoretical rationales for the two distinct forums'
standards discussed in Part I, the federal court system and the PTO
also developed analytical frameworks to implement the claim
construction standards in practice. The district court standard
developed primarily through case law, while the BRI standard is
explained in the PTO's interpretive guidance. However, since the
Federal Circuit reviews appeals from the PTO, case law sheds some
light on the BRI standard as well. The Federal Circuit has recognized
that "there is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim
construction." 95 Yet courts and the PTO have developed guiding
principles and canons of claim construction to improve predictability.
Despite the differing policy justifications behind the two standards, the
95. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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guidance on how to apply each standard is actually quite similar. Both
standards direct claim interpreters to read claims in the context of the
entire patent document, to emphasize the specification, and to interpret
claims from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.
Moreover, both standards employ many of the same specific rules for
claim construction. The similarity between guidance from the two
forums explains why many IPRs cite legal authority stemming from
district courts and casts doubt upon the practical importance of
maintaining two separate claim construction standards.
1. Instructions from Phillips
The Phillips decision reaffirmed and clarified claim construction
principles from other decisions. 96 With the central focus on determining
"ordinary and customary meaning" from the perspective of a "person of
ordinary skill in the art," the Federal Circuit developed a step-by-step
framework for construing claims.97 This analytical framework
emphasizes the importance of intrinsic evidence, with relevant sources
including the language of the claims themselves, the specification, the
prosecution history, and relevant extrinsic evidence.98 The central
message is that a claim construction cannot contradict the
unambiguous meaning of the words of a claim in light of the intrinsic
evidence. 99
The Phillips inquiry begins with "how a person of ordinary skill
in the art understands a claim term," based on the assumption that the
person of ordinary skill read the claim term in the context of the entire
patent.10 0 Since a person of ordinary skill is a member of the field of
invention, terms are given any special meaning or usage in the field,
unless the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and explicitly
defined a term. 101 Since claim meaning is often not immediately
apparent in disputed terms that give rise to litigation, courts look to
publicly available sources that show what a person of ordinary skill in
the art would have understood the disputed language to mean. 102 To
96. Id. ("Today, we adhere to that approach and reaffirm the approach outlined in [Vitronics],
in Markman, and in Innova."); see also Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
97. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313-24.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1322.
100. Id. at 1313.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1314.
1090 [Vol. 70:3:1071
A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE
conduct this inquiry, Phillips directed courts to first consult intrinsic
evidence and then to consider extrinsic evidence, though it is given less
weight. 103
a. Intrinsic Evidence
Within the category of intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit
articulated a hierarchy: first courts must consult the claim language
itself, then the written description, and finally the prosecution
history. 104 Claims do not stand alone, but rather are read in context of
the "fully integrated written instrument."10 5 The Federal Circuit
emphasized that the specification is "always highly relevant" to claim
construction, is usually dispositive, and is "the single best guide to the
meaning of a disputed term."106 Within the specification, the inventor's
own lexicography governs if the inventor defined the term, and
statements about claim scope, such as an intentional disavowal or
disclaimer, are dispositive. 107 Courts should also consider the
prosecution history, including cited prior art, because it provides
evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent and
whether the inventor limited the invention during examination.108
However, the prosecution history is less helpful than the specification
because it lacks finality and is often ambiguous. 109
b. Extrinsic Evidence
Phillips then authorized use of extrinsic evidence, such as expert
and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and treatises, but emphasized
that such evidence is less significant and cannot be used to contradict
intrinsic evidence. 110 Within the class of extrinsic evidence, the Federal
Circuit noted that technical dictionaries may be particularly helpful in
understanding the underlying technology and the perspective of a
103. See id. at 1314-15.
104. Id. at 1314-17.
105. Id. at 1315.
106. Id. at 1315-16 (describing how the Federal Circuit has long emphasized the importance
of the specification as the "primary basis" for construing claims, the Supreme Court has endorsed
the emphasis on the specification, and § 112 places importance on the specification by requiring
the inventor to describe the invention in "full, clear, concise, and exact terms").
107. Id. at 1316.
108. Id. at 1317 ("[L]ike the specification, the prosecution history was created by the patentee
in attempting to explain and obtain the patent.").
109. Id. (noting that prosecution history is "an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the
applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation").
110. Id. at 1317-18 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
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person of ordinary skill."'x The court also condoned the use of expert
testimony to provide background on technology, to explain how an
invention works, to ascertain the understanding of a person of ordinary
skill, or to establish a particular meaning in the field; however, it
cautioned that conclusory, unsupported assertions are not useful. 112
Therefore, any expert testimony clearly at odds with the intrinsic
evidence should be discounted. 113 Moreover, though general
dictionaries are permitted to define commonly understood meanings of
words, the Federal Circuit reiterated that the focus of the Phillips
inquiry must be from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the
art and that such evidence cannot be used to contradict any definition
ascertained from the intrinsic evidence. 114
2. Guidance from the PTO
The PTO published guidance for patent examiners on how to
implement the BRI standard in the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure ("MPEP"). 115 The PTO has noted that the broadest
reasonable interpretation "does not mean the broadest possible
interpretation."1 1 6 Instead, the meaning assigned to a term must be
consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the term and
with the specification and drawings.117 Moreover, the broadest
reasonable interpretation must focus on what is reasonable from the
perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.118 Similar to Phillips,
the central focus of the BRI standard is on the meaning a person of
ordinary skill would infer from the intrinsic evidence of the patent
document.
111. Id. at 1318:
Because dictionaries, and especially technical dictionaries, endeavor to collect the
accepted meanings of terms used in various fields of science and technology, those
resources have been properly recognized as among the many tools that can assist the
court in determining the meaning of particular terminology to those of skill in the art
of the invention.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1322.
115. MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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a. Interpretation Sources
The MPEP's guidance on claim interpretation makes it clear
that the BRI standard is effectively the same as Phillips. After
describing the theoretical framework of BRI, the MPEP states claim
terms are given their "plain meaning," unless such meaning is
inconsistent with the specification. 119 Quoting Phillips, it further
explains that "plain meaning" refers to the ordinary and customary
meaning given to the term by those of ordinary skill in the art. 120 Thus,
the BRI standard starts to become circular: the MPEP articulates a
different name for the standard but returns directly to Phillips to
actually put the standard into practice. 12 1 Therefore, the PTAB judges
are merely following the PTO's lead when they employ legal citations
deriving from the district court arena.
In addition to quoting Phillips, the MPEP adopts guiding
principles similar to Phillips, such as focusing on intrinsic evidence and
the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art. Just as Phillips
explains that the specification is usually dispositive, the MPEP states
the specification is the "best source" for determining the meaning of a
claim term.122 Additionally, the MPEP states that extrinsic evidence
(i.e., prior art) can be considered as long as it is consistent with the use
of a term in the specification. However, "when the specification is clear
about the scope and content of a claim term, there is no need to turn to
extrinsic evidence." 123 This principle again mirrors the Phillips
directive that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to contradict any
definition ascertained from the intrinsic evidence and should
accordingly be given less weight. 124 The Federal Circuit echoed this
implicit endorsement of the Phillips standard-while applying the BRI
standard to a PTO appeal, the court noted that Phillips "set forth the
119. Id. at § 2111.01.
120. Id. ("[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term
would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as
of the effective filing date of the patent application." (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc))).
121. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.01; see also Dawn-Marie
Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent Office's "Broadest Reasonable
Interpretation" Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 285, 309-10 (2009) (noting that the MPEP recites the
same methodology as district courts); Fischer & Jones, supra note 45, at 24 (noting an implicit
endorsement of the Phillips approach in claim interpretation before the PTO).
122. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315; MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.01 ("[T]he greatest clarity
is obtained when the specification serves as a glossary for claim terms.").
123. MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.01 (citing 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725
F.3d 1315, 1326-28 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
124. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (stating courts should discount expert testimony that is
clearly at odds with the claims, written description, and prosecution history).
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best practices for claim construction" and applied those best practices
without any reference to how the interpretation was broader or
somehow different from a Phillips interpretation. 125 The instructions to
use interpretation sources in the same manner as the Phillips standard
help explain why the PTAB cites district court authority with such
frequency during claim construction under the BRI standard.
b. The Reasonableness Requirement
Despite the similarities between the standards, the phrase
"broadest reasonable" facially distinguishes the BRI standard from
Phillips, providing an opportunity for the PTO to articulate how the
BRI standard differs in practice. However, commentators have noted
the lack of guidance on what constitutes a "reasonable"
interpretation. 126 The MPEP provides little specific guidance on how to
determine whether an interpretation is "reasonable" under the BRI
standard; case law rarely discusses "reasonableness" as an independent
factor; and the Federal Circuit has not articulated any independent test
to determine reasonableness. 127 In noting that the broadest reasonable
interpretation does not mean the broadest possible interpretation, the
MPEP specifies that instead, a claim term must be given a meaning
consistent with "the ordinary and customary meaning of the term" and
the written description. 128 It further explains that the broadest
reasonable meaning must be consistent with the perspective of a person
of ordinary skill in the art.129 Again, these explanations return to the
concepts underlying Phillips. Thus, despite the difference in language,
the MPEP's guidance underlying the reasonableness requirement-like
its guidance on the BRI framework generally-is also circular. The lack
of concrete guidance on the component of the BRI standard that facially
distinguishes it from Phillips further explains why the PTAB cited
district court-originated authority with such frequency during claim
construction in IPRs.
125. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
126. Bey & Cotropia, supra note 121, at 309 (noting it is difficult to find examples in Federal
Circuit case law of how to implement the BRI standard); Miller, supra note 68, at 281 ("An
understanding of 'reasonable' is elusive, as none of the cases reviewed for this article define this
term or provide any objective parameters for determining reasonableness.").
127. See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (describing
the "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard); MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111; Bey & Cotropia,
supra note 121, at 309; Miller, supra note 68, at 281.
128. MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.
129. Id. (citing In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
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3. Shared Canons of Claim Construction
Unsurprisingly, given the similarity of the guiding principles,
interpreters apply many of the same interpretation rules to construe
claims under both the Phillips and BRI standards. Some specific
interpretation rules common to both standards, which I term "shared
canons of claim construction," are used with particular frequency.
The first canon is that a patentee's own lexicography governs. 130
Thus, if a patentee explicitly defines a term or clearly defines a term by
consistently using it a certain way in the patent document, the term is
given that meaning regardless of any other evidence. 13 1 The second
canon is that limitations cannot be imported from the specification into
the claim. 1 3 2 Therefore, if a written description refers to certain
preferred embodiments, the claims cannot be narrowly construed to
only encompass those specific embodiments. 133 For example, if the
patent claimed "coffee mugs" and the written description said, "in one
embodiment, coffee mugs are made out of clay," the claim would not
necessarily be limited to only clay coffee mugs. The third canon is that
a preamble (the introductory element in a claim) is only a limitation
when it breathes life and meaning into the claim. 13 4 If the preamble
describes the purpose or intended use of the invention, it is not a
limitation. 135 A fourth canon is that terms are used consistently
throughout a patent document. 136 Thus, when looking to claim
language, the context in which a term is used is "highly instructive,"
and use of a term in other claims or in the specification can help define
130. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Renishaw PLC v.
Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475,
1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Fed.
Cir. 1992)) (holding that an inventor may define terms but must do so with "reasonable clarity,
deliberateness, and precision"); MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.01.
131. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316-17; MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.01.
132. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Liebel-
Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004); MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.01.
133. Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Where a
specification does not require a limitation, that limitation should not be read from the specification
into the claims."); MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.01.
134. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999); MPEP,
supra note 67, § 2111.02.
135. Catalina Mktg. Int'l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002); MPEP,
supra note 67, § 2111.02.
136. In re Rambus Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 48 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("'[U]nless otherwise compelled ...
the same claim term in the same patent'. . . 'carries the same construed meaning.' "); Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1314.
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a claim term. 137 A fifth canon is known as claim differentiation. 138 This
canon states that differences among claims present a presumption that
limitations in one dependent claim do not exist in the independent
claim.139 For example, if the independent claim covered a coffeemaker
with individual serving cups, and the dependent claim covered a
coffeemaker with individual serving cups made of plastic, the
independent claim would not be limited to merely coffeemakers with
plastic serving cups. Finally, the sixth canon is that though a patent
owner can disavow claim scope in the patent document, the disavowal
must be clear and unmistakable. 14 0 Here, even when claim language
may be broad enough to encompass certain features when read in
isolation, the claim term is considered to disclaim the features if the
specification makes clear that the invention does not include said
features. 141
Therefore, part of the reason why the standards are converging
in practice is because the two different standards use the same major
canons of construction. The shared canons explain why many IPR
decisions cited direct or indirect district court authority during claim
construction sections. But the overlap is even greater because many of
the "pure PTO" citations also stated these shared canons. For example,
two of the most commonly cited propositions in the pure PTO category
were that limitations should not be read from the specification into the
claims 14 2 and that a patent owner can act as "his own lexicographer" by
providing a definition with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
precision-the first and second of the shared canons. 1 4 3 Overall, the
frequency of overlapping citations suggests that these shared canons
constitute the majority of the legal tools cited during claim construction
analysis and casts doubt on any real difference between the two legal
standards in practice.
137. Rambus, 694 F.3d at 48; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
138. Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1275 (Fed. Cir.
2012); ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
139. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314-15.
140. In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1149-50 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Am. Acad.
of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1365-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001); MPEP, supra note 67, § 2111.01.
141. SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1341.
142. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
143. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). This case went on to cite a district
court-originated case in the following sentence when it further elaborated on how a patent owner
could act as his own lexicographer. Id.
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B. Reigning in the Reasonableness Requirement
In addition to the similar legal guidance and shared canons of
interpretation behind the two standards, another reason for the
convergence of the two standards in practice could be recent efforts by
the Federal Circuit to add force to the "reasonable" requirement to
narrow claim constructions under the BRI standard. Despite the lack of
interpretive guidance about the meaning of "reasonable" in the BRI
standard, the Federal Circuit recently weighed in on what constitutes
a "reasonable" construction in the IPR context. By narrowing
"reasonableness" under the BRI standard using bedrock principles of
the Phillips standard, the Federal Circuit further converged the two
standards. In Microsoft v. Proxyconn, an appeal from an IPR final
written decision, the Federal Circuit suggested the scope of what is
considered reasonable should be limited: "That is not to say, however,
that the [PTAB] may construe claims during IPR so broadly that its
constructions are unreasonable under general claim construction
principles." 144 Though the opinion did not articulate a specific test for
determining reasonableness, the court went on to emphasize claim
construction principles that appear to bring the reasonableness
requirement within the scope of Phillips.
By narrowing what is considered reasonable, the Federal Circuit
further placed IPR proceedings under the jurisprudential umbrella of
Phillips.1 4 5 The court directed that claims should "always be read in
light of the specification" and that the PTO should consult prosecution
history during IPRs. 146 The court then reiterated the importance of the
specification and the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the
144. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also SAS
Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("While we have endorsed
the Board's use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in IPR proceedings, we also
take care to not read 'reasonable' out of the standard."); In re Man Mach. Interface Techs. LLC,
822 F.3d 1282, 1286-87 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding PTAB claim constructions unreasonable in light
of the specification); Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1298-1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (relying
on district court-originated authority to find a PTAB construction unreasonable because it ran
counter to the claim construction principle that an interpretation must give meaning to all claim
terms). But see PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc'ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 734, 740-46
(Fed. Cir. 2016), vacated, 815 F.3d 747, 751-57 (finding one claim term interpretation differed
under BRI than it would under Phillips, but that other terms would have the same interpretation
under either standard).
145. See Microsoft, 789 F.3d at 1298 (applying the broadest reasonable interpretation as
explained in Phillips); Eckstein et al., supra note 81, at 1.
146. Microsoft, 789 F.3d at 1298.
10972017]
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
art. 147 Overall, the construction cannot be "unreasonably broad," and a
construction that does not reasonably reflect the plain language and
disclosure does not pass muster because the broadest reasonable
interpretation does not include a "legally incorrect" interpretation. 1 4 8
Thus, the Federal Circuit used the "reasonableness" requirement in the
BRI standard to emphasize the central importance of the specification
and the perspective of a person of ordinary skill-both of which are
central focuses of the Phillips standard.
After this clarification of the reasonableness requirement, the
Federal Circuit then applied the BRI standard to construe three claim
phrases relying only on intrinsic evidence, providing a few examples of
how to implement the BRI standard. 149 Proxyconn involved a patent
covering a system for transmitting data signals between two computers.
In the initial IPR proceeding, the PTAB found claims unpatentable as
anticipated (i.e., not novel) and obvious. Yet on appeal, the Federal
Circuit disagreed with some of the PTAB's claim constructions,
explaining why these constructions were incorrect. The PTAB
construed the first phrase, "two other computers," to mean "any two
computers." However, the Federal Circuit found that the claim
language and the specification clearly limited the phrase to more
specific types of computers, thus finding the PTAB construction
"unreasonably broad."150 The PTAB construed the second phrase,
"sender/computer" and "receiver/computer," to include intermediaries
connecting the two computers. 15 1 The Federal Circuit, however, found
this interpretation unreasonably broad because the specification clearly
referred to the elements as independent components of an overall
system. 152
Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB's construction of
the third term: "searching for data." 153 The PTAB interpreted this term
to mean searching from "among a set of data objects," rather than
merely comparing two values. 154 The Federal Circuit found this
construction consistent with the way the term "searching for data" was
147. Id. ("Even under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the [PTAB]'s construction
'cannot be divorced from the specification and the record evidence,' and 'must be consistent with
the one that those skilled in the art would reach.' ").
148. See id. Note that the use of the phrase "incorrect" is reminiscent of the Phillips court's
goal of finding the "correct" construction.
149. Id. at 1298-1302.
150. Id. at 1298-99.
151. Id. at 1300.
152. Id. ("Stated simply, the Board's construction... does not reasonably reflect the language
and disclosure of the '717 patent.").
153. Id. at 1301.
154. Id.
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used throughout the specification and figures. 155 In affirming that the
PTAB's construction passed muster under BRI, the Federal Circuit
made an interesting move-in a footnote, it commented, "We would
reach the same result if we were to apply the traditional claim
construction framework set forth in Phillips."156 Thus, it recognized
that the claim construction standards overlap-the Federal Circuit
reigned in "unreasonably broad" constructions, but allowed a
construction that conforms to the Phillips framework as reasonable. 157
It is worth noting that the practical effect of these narrower
constructions seems to be minimal. On remand, the PTAB used the
Federal Circuit's narrower constructions to reconsider the validity
challenges of eight patent claims. 15 8 All eight claims were still found
unpatentable. 159 The PTAB affirmed five claims on the same grounds
as its initial decision. 160 The remaining three claims were no longer
anticipated by prior art under the new construction, but they were still
obvious and thus still deemed invalid. 16 1 Therefore, given that the
Federal Circuit noted that the BRI construction it affirmed would be
the same under Phillips, and that the end result was the same for
claims applying the narrowed constructions, it appears the differences
between claim constructions may not have a large practical effect in
terms of changing whether a specific claim is ultimately found valid or
invalid. 162
C. Alternative Explanations for Differences in Constructions
Since the standards apply the same legal principles and the
reasonableness requirement may be narrowing constructions under
BRI, the difference between the two standards is likely one of mindset-
similar to the difference between the "substantial evidence" standard
and "clearly erroneous" standard as articulated in Dickinson v.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1301 n.1 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane)).
This opinion was written by Chief Judge Prost, who filed a dissent from the denial to rehear Cuozzo
en bane. In that dissent, she expressed that the Phillips standard should be applied in IPRs. Thus,
this footnote may reflect the current division at the Federal Circuit, with some judges trying to
bring IiPR claim construction in uniformity with traditional district court claim construction.
157. See Eckstein et al., supra note 81, at 1-2.
158. See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., Nos. IPR2012-00026, IPR2013-00109, 2015 WL
8536725, at *6-8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2015).
159. Id. at *8.
160. Three of the claims were obvious and two were anticipated. Id. at *68.
161. Id. at *4-6.
162. See also Micrografx, LLC v. Google Inc., 2016 WL 6958652, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 29, 2016)
(finding a PTAB construction incorrect but affirming the invalidity result due to harmless error).
2017] 1099
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Zurko. 163 In that opinion, the Supreme Court noted that the difference
between the two standards for reviewing factual findings at district
courts versus the PTO was subtle. The Court explained that the
difficulty in finding cases where the standard made a difference may be
due to the "difficulty of attempting to capture in a form of words
intangible factors such as judicial confidence in the fairness of the
factfinding process" and "comparatively greater importance of case-
specific factors," ultimately concluding that practical experience of the
judges may play a more important role in assuring proper review than
does the specific standard.164
Similarly, differences in ultimate claim constructions at the
PTAB and district courts may be based on grounds other than the
differing claim construction standards, such as idiosyncratic
interpretations or litigants' arguments. To compare how ultimate
outcomes may vary between the two forums through a more fact-specific
lens, this Section discusses a few IPR final written decisions that
expressly mentioned district court constructions of identical claim
terms. These decisions suggest that the PTAB recognizes an overlap
between the BRI and Phillips standards, is willing to consider district
court constructions, and may reach different constructions based on a
different interpretation of the facts under the common canons of
construction. This Section contends that different constructions may be
due to inherent ambiguities in interpretation or individual litigants'
behavior rather than an actual difference between the standards.
1. Inherent Ambiguities in Interpretation
In statutory interpretation cases, though judges apply the same
canons of construction, they often split on the ultimate interpretation
of terms.16 5 For example, in Muscarello v. United States,1 6 6 the majority
applied traditional statutory interpretation canons to find that the term
"carry" in a criminal statute included carrying weapons in one's car. 167
The dissent also employed traditional statutory interpretation tools,
but concluded that "carry" was limited to carrying weapons on one's
163. 527 U.S. 150, 156-58 (1999).
164. Id. at 163.
165. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (where the majority and dissent
came to opposite conclusions about the meaning of the word "carry" in a statute using similar
statutory interpretation tools); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or.,
515 U.S. 687 (1995) (where the majority and dissent came to opposite conclusions about the
meaning of "harm" in the Endangered Species Act while applying traditional statutory
interpretation tools).
166. Muscearello, 524 U.S. at 125.
167. Id. at 126-27.
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person. 168 In general, disputes arise because terms are ambiguous and
reasonable minds could differ on interpretations. Thus, it is
unsurprising that judges frequently come to different conclusions when
applying the same legal standards. 169 This suggests that the difference
in constructions may not be due to different standards, but rather due
to the inherent nature of interpreting ambiguous terms. The following
two cases suggest that when claim constructions come out differently,
the divergence may be due to the ambiguous nature of the terms rather
than any difference in the legal construction standards.
When the intrinsic evidence is clear, the constructions are likely
to be the same. In LG Display Co. v. Innovative Display Tech. LLC, a
patent owner argued the Phillips standard should be applied in the
final written decision because the patent expired during the trial.170.
Yet the PTAB noted it was "not persuaded ... that applying the Phillips
standard would affect our determination of this case." 171 The dispute
involved a patent that claimed a light emitting panel assembly, which
included a panel with a "pattern of light extracting deformities." 1 7 2
Based on an express definition in the specification, the district court
construed "deformities" to mean "any change in the shape or geometry
of the panel surface . .. that causes a portion of light to be emitted." 173
Since the specification clearly defined the term, and the patent owner
offered no evidence to support a different construction, the PTAB
maintained the same construction. 174
Yet when the intrinsic evidence is less clear, the differences may
be based on judges' individual readings of the factual record. In Ford
Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, 175 the PTAB came to a different construction of
the same term as a district court while explicitly applying Phillips legal
authority during an IPR. The IPR involved a patent that covered a
hybrid vehicle, which included a combustion engine and an electric
motor. A certain amount of torque is required to operate the vehicle and
that amount may vary, so a microprocessor measured the vehicle's
current torque requirements against a predefined "setpoint" to
determine whether to operate the vehicle through the engine, electric
168. Id. at 140.
169. See id. at 126-27, 140.
170. No. IPR2014-01096, 2015 WL 9275207 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2015).
171. Id. at *2.
172. Id. at *1.
173. Id. at *2.
174. Id.
175. No. IPR 2014-00884, 2015 WL 8536739 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2015). This case is an example
of where the PTAB is applying the BRI standard, but cites the Phillips case directly for legal
authority when construing the claims.
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motor, or both at any given time. Parties disputed whether the claim
term "setpoint" required data about torque specifically or could include
other types of data. A district court had recently construed the claim
term and found "setpoint" did not require a torque-based data point, so
the patent owner argued a construction that limited the data to torque-
based values would conflict with this construction.17 6 The PTAB
indicated that though it construed claims under a different standard
than the district court, it was willing to consider the district court's
construction.17 7 The district court found the data was not limited to
torque-based values because the specification provided examples of
other types of measurement. 178 However, the PTAB still came to a
different conclusion-and it did so by applying Phillips.179 Since
Phillips counseled that claim terms should be read in context of the
language of the claim itself, the PTAB found that the claim language
itself limited the setpoint data to torque-based values, despite other
examples in the specification.1 8 0 This seems to conflict with the
theoretical rationales behind the two standards because by adding a
limitation, the PTAB construction appears to be narrower than the
district court construction. However, ultimately, this example shows
that the difference in constructions does not come from the legal
interpretation standard, but rather on a different view of the
ambiguous terms based on differing readings of the intrinsic evidence.
Since the PTAB applied Phillips legal principles, the different
construction is not due to an actual distinct legal standard. Instead, the
difference in the district court and PTAB constructions is analogous to
the difference between the majority and dissent interpretations in
Muscarello.181
2. Litigant Behavior
Beyond inherent ambiguities in textual interpretation,
differences in constructions may be due to litigants' behavior. The
PTAB has noted that the arguments a litigant presents in the
176. Id. at *4.
177. Id. ("Given that [patent owner's] principal argument to the board ... was expressly tied
to the district court's claim construction, we think that the board had an obligation, in these
circumstances, to evaluate that construction." (quoting Power Integrations, Inc. v. Lee, 797 F.3d
1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015))).
178. Id. at *5.
179. Id. (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc)).
180. Id.
181. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
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proceeding influence the ultimate construction. 182 For example, in
Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc., a dispute arose over whether a "secure domain
service" was required to "recognize and resolve" computer addresses or
merely "resolve" addresses. 183 The PTAB began its analysis with the
claim language, quoting Phillips, and found that the claims did not
require the service to recognize addresses. 184 The patent owner pointed
to the prosecution history to argue it disclaimed embodiments of the
invention that merely resolve addresses.185 However, the PTAB found
that the prosecution history did not amount to an unambiguous
disclaimer. 186 In adopting this construction, the PTAB emphasized that
the patent owner made different arguments before the district court
and that the PTAB was deciding on a different record.187 Thus, the
information presented in front of the PTAB affected the ultimate
construction.
IV. COMING FULL CIRCLE: RECOGNIZING A SINGLE CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION SYSTEM
Since the BRI standard and the Phillips standard apply mostly
the same legal principles, officially changing the standard is unlikely to
have much practical effect on ultimate rates of invalidation. 188
However, there are still reasons that the PTAB should officially adopt
the Phillips standard because maintaining the separate standards still
presents potential problems with inefficiency, lack of uniformity, and
decreased confidence in patent rights. For example, despite the
similarity in analytical tools, the PTAB and district courts engage in
new claim construction analysis even when one forum has already
construed the exact same patent because of the nominally different
standards. Moreover, the official use of the BRI standard contributes to
concerns amongst patent owners that their patents are more likely to
be invalidated in IPR proceedings than in district court litigation. This
Part argues that officially applying the Phillips standard in IPR
proceedings will better support the goals of patent law by increasing
182. See LG Display Co. v. Innovative Display Techs. LLC, No. IPR2014-01096, 2015 WL
9275207, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2015); Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc., No. IPR2014-00481, 2015 WL
5047986, at *8-9 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 24, 2015).
183. Apple, 2015 WL 5047986 at *8-9.
184. Id. at *9.
185. Id. at *12-14.
186. Id. at*14.
187. Id. The PTAB seemed to be implying the district court would have adopted the same
standard if the court had the same arguments and evidence now available to the PTAB.
188. See supra Part III.
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efficiency, uniformity, and confidence in patent rights. This Part then
suggests that Congress is the best actor to formally adopt the Phillips
construction standard. Finally, this Part provides suggestions for
practitioners and administrative law judges while the proposed
legislation is pending.
A. The PTAB Should Apply the Same Standard as District Courts
Officially applying the Phillips standard in IPR proceedings
would better support the overarching goals of patent policy in three
main ways: increasing efficiency, promoting uniformity, and
strengthening confidence in patent rights. One of the AIA's major aims
in creating IPRs was to reduce litigation costs. 18 9 Applying the Phillips
standard in IPR proceedings would decrease litigation costs by allowing
the PTAB to adopt district court constructions directly rather than
relitigating the issue when a district court has already construed a
claim term. 190 Officially recognizing the same standard would allow the
two forums to utilize the same construction without having to
separately wade through the fact-intensive record to construe the same
terms. 191 However, applying the same claim construction standard
would not necessarily require the PTAB to adopt a district court's
construction-the PTAB may still re-evaluate all factual information
while applying the same standard. Thus, to promote efficiency,
Congress should consider amending the AIA to also provide estoppel for
189. H.R. REP. No. 112-98(I), pt. 1, at 40 (2011) ('The legislation is designed to establish a
more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit
unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.").
190. The PTAB has cited the different claim construction standards as the reason it is not
bound by district court constructions. See Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Depomed, Inc., No. IPR2014-00654,
2015 WL 5636413, at *5 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 21, 2015) ("Given our different claim construction
standard, however, we are not bound by the prior district court constructions or any alleged
agreements between the parties made in district court."). However, the PTAB currently does
consider district court constructions and sometimes adopts those constructions directly. See, e.g.,
Oracle Corp. v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., No. IPR2014-01207, 2016 WL 380195, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Jan.
29, 2016); Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., No. IPR2014-01544, 2016 WL 380233, at *4
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2016).
191. Professor Tim Holbrook has argued that district courts could apply issue preclusion to
PTAB claim constructions even under the dual claim construction regime, and issue preclusion
would almost certainly apply if both forums applied the Phillips standard. Timothy R. Holbrook,
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board's Evolving Impact on Claim Construction, 24 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2828962 [https://perma.cc/9UQR-CZQP]. In light of the similarity of the two standards in
practice, applying issue preclusion when one forum has already construed a term would promote
the goals of patent law and could be a beneficial option for district courts. See id.
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claim construction issues already decided under the same standard in
district courts. 19 2
The patent law system also favors uniformity, on the ground
that predictability increases the value of intellectual property rights. 193
Officially recognizing a singular claim construction standard would
promote uniformity by expressly communicating that the PTAB and the
federal courts are applying the same claim construction standards.
Directing patent owners and competitors to one clear line of reasoning
for claim construction-rather than to an alternate, circular system-
would increase predictability for patent owners and litigants on how
claims will be construed. Though judges interpret facts differently even
under the same legal standard, officially applying the same legal
standard would bring predictability to the legal tools used during claim
construction because the current lack of clarity about what the BRI
standard entails creates uncertainty for patent owners about what legal
tests will be used to construe their patent claims.
Finally, another aim of the AIA was to take away disincentives
to innovation. 194 Even though it appears the BRI is unlikely to make a
practical difference, the standard has caused concerns among patent
owners and is cited as a reason that patents may be more likely to be
invalidated during IPRs. 195 Thus, an official adoption of the Phillips
standard would calm these fears that threaten confidence in patent
rights.
B. Potential Methods to Change the Standard
The PTAB could begin applying the Phillips standard through
two mechanisms: (1) Congress could amend the AIA, or (2) the PTO
could promulgate a new regulation. Congress is the best branch to make
this change. If the PTO promulgated a new regulation stating it would
apply the Phillips standard during IPRs, it may not be able to actually
require the PTAB to adopt district court constructions because such a
rule may go against congressional intent, as discussed below. 1 9 6
Changing the construction standard without requiring the PTAB to
explicitly adopt district court constructions would still help the patent
192. See infra Section IV.B.
193. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct.
2131 (2016) (No. 15-446), 2015 WL 5895939, at *18 (explaining that the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of uniformity in claim construction).
194. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98(I), pt. 1, at 39 (discussing a "growing sense that questionable
patents are too easily obtained and are too difficult to challenge").
195. Dolin, supra note 9, at 916; Michel, supra note 9, at 50.
196. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
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system though, as recognizing a common claim construction framework
would still increase predictability and confidence in the patent system.
Yet going a step further and explicitly requiring the PTAB to adopt
district court constructions would better promote efficiency, since the
PTAB would not have to relitigate the same interpretation issues
already considered by a district court. 1 9 7 Thus, if Congress-rather than
the PTO-were to act, it could amend the AIA to expressly allow, or
even require, the PTAB to adopt district court constructions.
Pending legislation may do just that, though the text is not quite
clear. Two pending pieces of legislation would amend the AIA to require
that "each claim of a patent shall be construed as such claim would be
in a civil action to invalidate the patent under section 282(b)," the
statutory provision under which federal courts determine patent
validity. 198 This legislation would also specify that the PTAB should
construe the claim according to the ordinary and customary meaning as
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, consult prosecution
history, and consider a previous claim construction or determination if
another court has previously construed the term. 199 Thus, the proposed
text merely requires the PTAB to "consider," not "adopt," district court
constructions. 2 0 0 By stating that claims should be construed as they
would be under § 282(b), the text seems to say that the PTAB should
apply exactly the same procedures as district courts for claim
construction. However, the proposed legislation is not absolutely clear
about whether congressional intent is for the PTAB to adopt previously
made constructions. Congress should be clear about this before passing
any amendments. Overall, any amendment that at least endorses the
district court claim construction standard, even without requiring the
PTAB to adopt the exact same construction, would still promote patent
policies of efficiency, uniformity, and confidence in patent rights.
However, the best solution would be an express adoption by Congress.
C. Practical Suggestions
While the debate over whether to officially apply the Phillips
standard lingers before Congress, practitioners should frame their
arguments for IPRs using the Phillips framework. This provides more
197. See Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Depomed, Inc., No. IPR2014-00654, 2015 WL 5636413, at *5
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 21, 2015) (reviewing evidence to support a claim construction similar to evidence
already reviewed by a district court).
198. PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 11(a)(4)(A)(vii) (2015) (as reported by S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Sept. 8, 2015).
199. Id.
200. See id.
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concrete guidance and is likely to comport with the methodology the
PTAB will apply.20 1 Moreover, consistency in arguments before the
PTAB and district court will help increase the likelihood of similar
claim construction outcomes. 202 In the patent examination context,
applicants should take special care to make sure terms are clearly
defined in the patent document. The overlapping legal principles show
that the claim construction inquiry focuses on the intrinsic evidence. 203
Though it is impossible to anticipate every dispute that will arise in
litigation, the IPRs have increased the likelihood of an interpreter later
construing the claims and thus have increased the importance of
providing a clear written description.204
Moreover, administrative law judges should be more explicit
about how they determine what is "reasonable" in IPR final written
decisions, as should the PTO in its administrative guidance. Providing
more concrete, generalized guidance on how they determine what is
reasonable would give more predictability to practitioners, which
would, in turn, promote the patent law policies of efficiency, uniformity,
and confidence in patent rights. Additionally, if Congress opts to
maintain the distinction between the standards, such guidance could
help illuminate the difference between the standards for practitioners
to the extent any practical differences exist.
Going forward, questions remain for future research. If the
PTAB's claim construction standard is not significantly different from
the district court claim construction standard, perhaps other factors are
contributing to the high rate of invalidation at the PTAB. Notably, the
PTAB and district courts apply different evidentiary standards. 205
Thus, a challenger in an IPR proceeding only has to prove
unpatentability by preponderance of the evidence, and this lower
standard could make it easier to invalidate patents in IPR contexts. 206
More research should be done on whether similar evidence leads to
differing results in the PTAB and the district court based on these
evidentiary standards. Additionally, future research should compare
the technical backgrounds of PTAB judges and federal court judges to
determine whether such technical backgrounds have any effect on
201. See supra Part II.
202. See Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc., No. IPR2014-00481, 2015 WL 5047986, at *6, *8 (P.T.A.B.
Aug. 24, 2015).
203. See supra Section III.A.
204. See Kapadia, supra note 12, at 115.
205. See Tamimi, supra note 22, at 617 (noting that patent challengers must prove invalidity
by a preponderance of the evidence before the PTAB but by clear and convincing evidence before
district courts).
206. See id.
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ultimate invalidation rates. Since IPRs are becoming a substantial part
of the patent litigation landscape, researchers should continue
observing PTAB actions and decisions.
CONCLUSION
A dual system of claim construction developed due to the need
to broadly explore full claim scope at the PTO and the desire to
accurately interpret terms based on the written record at the federal
courts. Both standards sought to further the public notice function of
patents, and thus both standards articulated similar guiding principles
for interpretation-focusing on intrinsic evidence and others in the field
of invention as the relevant audience. Yet as the two standards apply
shared canons of construction, cross-cite authority, and provide little
legal guidance on how "broadest reasonable" differs from "ordinary and
customary," the distinction between the two standards has blurred in
practice. Although the PTAB officially applies the BRI standard in IPR
proceedings, the BRI standard is a circular standard that has little
practical difference from the Phillips standard on ultimate validity
determinations. In the confused claim construction jurisprudence, all
roads lead to Phillips. Congress should go there too.
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